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THE INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND POLICY CENTER (IATPC)
The International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center (IATPC) was established in 1990 in the Institute of Food and Agriculture Sciences (IFAS) at the University of Florida (UF). The mission of the Center is to conduct a multi-disciplinary research, education and outreach program with a major focus on issues that influence competitiveness of specialty crop agriculture in support of consumers, industry, resource owners and policy makers. The Center facilitates collaborative research, education and outreach programs across colleges of the university, with other universities and with state, national and international organizations. The Center's objectives are to:
• Serve as the University-wide focal point for research on international trade, domestic and foreign legal and policy issues influencing specialty crop agriculture.
• Support initiatives that enable a better understanding of state, U.S. and international policy issues impacting the competitiveness of specialty crops locally, nationally, and internationally.
• Serve as a nation-wide resource for research on public policy issues concerning specialty crops.
• Disseminate research results to, and interact with, policymakers; research, business, industry, and resource groups; and state, federal, and international agencies to facilitate the policy debate on specialty crop issues.
Introduction
Several features differentiate technology adoption specifically targeted against invasive species from the conventional technology adoption geared towards increasing productivity in agriculture. For one, the adoption and dis-adoption of technology may be correlated with pest population. A reduction or elimination of pest population may lead to dis-adoption of that technology. Second, technology itself may continue to change faster than the rate of adoption due to the need to incorporate resistance/control of multiple pests, consumer reaction, productivity effects, etc 1 . Finally, technology adoption in conventional agriculture is geared towards attaining higher profitability, whereas the immediate aim of technology adoption against invasives is mostly preventative in nature and therefore is subject to fluctuations borne out by adopter's psychological responses such as complacencies or compulsions.
Technology adoption is significantly influenced by learning by doing or observing, as has been argued in the literature. However, in case of adoption of a new technology in order to ward off a threat from invasion species, complacency may play a crucial role in determining its extent of adoption and consequently decide the eventual eradication or establishment of the pest. Geoffard (1997) points out that vaccination demand for diseases such as tuberculosis, influenza, etc. falls as the prevalence of the disease in the population falls. This phenomenon, characterized as the prevalence effect, may also be found in the case of invasive species that threaten agriculture. Farmers, whose crops have not yet been infected with invasive species, might wait until the pest 1 For instance, the ability to include productivity enhancing genes along with pest-resistant features in soybean requires a larger genetic pool. Other desirable features may include those that enhance its consumer-desirability, such as low-saturated fatty acids and higher protein contents. Resistance to abiotic forces is also a desirable feature as it enhances productivity.
arrives as close to the neighbor's farm. This complacency may also be aggravated by the presence of government indemnity programs and insurance schemes that aim to compensate the farmer in the wake of damages from infestation, without imposing good farming practices. Empirical work on measuring or explaining the extent of complacency effects is still missing, but its existence has also been discerned in several other fields. (Longo 1990 ).
The analysis in this paper involves looking at the long term distribution of technology choices when technology can be adopted and dis-adopted based upon current and expected profits in agriculture. determined by nature and speed of the learning process for the farmer over the pest's optimal management strategy.
Model
Let there be two technologies, an existing one (f) and an alternative one (g) that is supposed to be more effective against invasive species. Technology g could be thought of as a pest resistant variety of crop that is available to the farmer, or a better management practice involving timely fungicide applications. The difference in the payoffs between these two technologies is given by: , where
θ is the deterministic component of payoff differential and ε is the stochastic component with a uniform distribution. Following the mathematical approach in Ellison and Feudenberg (1993) , we assume that the farmers' decision to adopt technology g is based upon a popularity weighting scheme that influences their decision to switch. This scheme is given by:
, where m is the popularity weight assigned to the proportion of ) 2 1 ( x m − $2bu/acre as compared to $10bu/acre for those who don't (Wherspann 2003) . In general, the rate of technology adoption has been found to be quite significant in agriculture in certain areas. farmers (x), who have already adopted the better technology. The farmers' decision problem is then to: Choose g if . Notice that under this kind of selection scheme, the more popular technology will be selected even if the current payoff from that technology is low. This is evident by substituting values of .5 or more for x in the above equation, which turns the right hand side negative.
We incorporate complacency effect by initially assuming that complacency sets in with an increase in the proportion of farmers adopting the better technology. This kind of assumption is justified in cases where an increase in the level of adoption has a negative influence on rate of infestation, thus reducing its risk of further spread. When this happens, a marginal increase in adoption of technology would require a higher differential in payoffs between the two technologies as the farmer is now reluctant to switch to the better technology if the threats have reduced. This possibility would lead to switching when:
, where is the parameter that influences the level of complacency and k determines the level of adopted population beyond which complacency sets in. Following the analysis in Ellison and Feudenberg (1993) we derive the dynamics of agricultural technology adoption and conditions for full technology adoption. Ellison and Feudenberg (1993) assume that in each period due to inertia, only a fraction of the population, given by
α , is able to make the choice of whether or not to switch. In the case of invasive species, this can be thought of as a spatial parameter which may relate to the proximity of the population that is up for choice, to the population that has already adopted the better technology. The increase in population that adopts the technology is then given by the rule:
where H is the cumulative distribution function of the random term ε . Growth in x is determined by the probability that the random element of the profit, ε , is at least larger than the popularity and complacency weighted deterministic element of profitsθ .
Similarly, the conditions for a downward movement in x are given by:
Following Ellison and Feudenberg (1993), level of x, say beyond which the better technology is certain to be adopted is given by:
Which can be derived noting that x is certain to move forward if the minimum value of payoff is positive. This is possible when
which gives:
Similarly, the value of x, say below which a backward step takes place with certainty is derived as :
, which gives:
Also, realizing that the minimum probability of an upward step is possible when x=0, we get this probability as:
Similarly, the minimum probability of a downward step is realized when x=1:
From above Ellison and Feudenberg derive the conditions for convergence of the technology as: (14) no convergence
Condition (12) implies that the better technology will eventually get adopted if . Also note that when 0 , . Therefore, when the popularity weighting impact net of any complacency impact equals the maximum range of the random error, the entire population converges towards the better technology.
Ellison and Feudenberg characterize this as the optimal weighting scheme as convergence happens with probability one. Similarly, when the popularity weighting impact net of any complacency impact either exceeds or is less than the maximum range (σ ) of random error, convergence is possible depending upon the starting point. Now, let's derive the conditions for convergence when complacency effect dominates popularity weighting. Specifically, the condition for a forward step with certainty is:
. Since, in this case , the lower the value m q > of x, the higher would be the probability of a forward jump. Therefore, a forward jump happens with certainty when:
. Similarly, a backward jump happens with certainty when:
It is obvious that the better technology will not be adopted with certainty, thus leading to less than full convergence in the long run. Notice that, as x increases, the probability of an upward step keeps decreasing. It can be shown that the system will converge towards the conventional technology with positive probability if <0. While the above setting assumes a linear equation between popularity and complacency effect, thus allowing the stronger effect to dominate, complacency effect may also be non-linear in level of adoption. For instance, low levels of adoption might also reflect low threat from disease, thus making would-be adopters in a neighboring region complacent. Similarly, high levels of adoption could imply a low level of disease too due to the impact of higher adoption, again discouraging remaining would-be adopters. Whereas, in the middle, the complacency effect could be low as would-be adopters see significant threat from the pest. Such, a relationship, however, is entirely governed by how pest infestation is influenced by technology adoption.
Some Extensions
Now, let us discuss some of the features that are unique to the agricultural technology associated with invasive species. One possibility is that the benefits from the better technology keep increasing with adoption as the pest population gets under control.
Another possibility is exactly the opposite; that of a falling differential in profits with increasing adoption. There are several reasons why this may happen and we discuss that in the ensuing sections. Finally, non-linearity in the profit differential is also taken up in this section.
Difference in Payoffs is increasing in Adoption
The payoff differential may be increasing with adoption of the new technology if the impact of the pest is increasing in proportion to the population using the better technology. This is a plausible scenario as the host size for the invasive species reduces, thereby concentrating the existing pest population on the remaining areas using the older technology. Such a payoff differential can be thought of as being dependent upon the proportion using the new technology as x θ .
Difference in Payoffs is falling in Adoption
Difference in payoffs could also be falling in profits due to several reasons. First, if the impact of the invasive plant falls with the level of adoption, making it impossible for the pest to establish once the host population (given by the percentage of population using the old technology) falls below a certain threshold. Initial adopters may be compensated for the high costs of production by the higher rewards from possible enhanced productivity. However, as the proportion of adopters of new technology increases, increased productivity might bring the profits down, thus making the new technology costlier. Note that this situation may also be highly conducive for complacent behavior, as a reduction in the difference in profits caused by reduced damages from pests discourages adoption of new technology. Second, profits may fall if the preferences for the old variety (using old technology) increase due to consumer skepticism and reluctance to try new varieties. Profits may fall also from an increased supply of the agricultural commodity in the market caused by the new technology. In certain cases the new technology may also end up adversely affecting other pests of the commodity thus increasing productivity (Livingston et al. 2004) . If the demand for the agricultural commodity is highly inelastic, this might cause a reduction in overall profits for every one. Finally, heterogeneity in population given by differences in production costs would lead to farmers with higher costs postponing their adoption until alter on. When this happens, there may be threshold level of population for technology adoption beyond which it is optimal for the farmers still using the conventional technology not to adopt.
Consider the possibility that the payoff differential is falling as given by:
A farmer would choose the better technology if:
. Now, the value of x beyond which a forward step is possible with certainty is given by: 2 x) +σ<0. This is shown below in figures 2 and 3. As is evident from the two figures above, neither forward nor backward steps are possible with certainty for any value of x, which should be obvious given the nonlinearity in the profit function and the ensuing dis-incentive to adopt marginally at high stages of adoption and dis-adopt marginally at low stages of overall adoption. Now, let us consider the long term distribution of the system. For m=2;θ=2;σ=5; the steady state distribution of the system between discrete states of adoption defined as: 
Technology Adoption and Disease Eradication
Heterogeneity in the population can be present due to several reasons such as differences in production and treatment costs, differences in the age, education and risk perception of the population etc. However, spatial heterogeneity may be another key factor that may have a significant impact on the level of adoption. So far in the above sections we have concentrated upon the level of technology adoption without paying any attention to how it may have an impact on disease spread and eradication. It is obvious that less than full adoption may have a bearing on the long term impact of the disease and we saw several cases above where the better technology could not be adopted with probability one. In this section we explore the impact of less than full adoption on disease establishment when there is spatial heterogeneity.
Consider the threat of infestation that affects two regions: x and y. Region x is the follower whereas region y is the one impacted first. Region x demonstrates complacency in adoption which is given by:
This complacency in adoption is not only based upon adoption within region x but also influenced by the level of adoption in region y as given by the parameter q. Notice that, as the level of technology adoption within region y increases, the threshold for adoption within region x falls at first, but once the level of adoption crosses half, the threshold level of adoption within x starts increasing in y. This captures the complacency that may set in from a temporary reduction in pest threats due to a higher level of adoption in the frontier region y. Region y has the standard response as:
. Probability of a forward step for region x is given by:
Probability of a forward step for region y is given by:
Now, in order to look at the steady state distribution of the system, we divide the state space into nine parts as follows: (18) The transition matrix representing the probability of transition between these nine states is shown in the Appendix. For parameter values (σ =5; θ =2; m=2; q=1), the steady state distribution in these nine states is given as: (19) Notice that the system has a high propensity to settle in the state when both the regions adopt the technology. Now consider a higher complacency effect in region x from adoption in region y. This is given by parameters: (σ =5; θ =2; m=2; q=4); the steady state distribution is now given as: (20) Notice that the propensity of the system to spend time in the last state when x and y have fully adopted has fallen drastically. Consider now, a scenario where profits are influenced by the level of adoption. More specifically, profits increase as the level of adoption increases in both the regions. We define parameters t1…t9 that replace θ depending upon the level of adoption in the two regions combined. The new set of parameters is: sigma=5;theta=2;m=2;q=1;t1=0;t2=.5;t3=1;t4=.5;t5=1;t6=1.5;t7=1;t8=1.5;t9=2;
The steady state distribution (say for the base case) is now defined as: (21) Obviously, an increase in profitability from adoption provides added incentive to adopt as is evident from the new steady state distribution. When profits are falling in adoption, which could happen due to an increase in productivity from a better technology adoption, there may exist an incentive not to adopt.
For the parameters:
Sigma=5;theta=2;m=2;q=1;t1=2;t2=1.5;t3=1;t4=1.5;t5=1;t6=.5;t7=1;t8=.5;t9=0; the steady state distribution is given as; (22) Another interesting exercise would be to consider the impact of a higher adoption in region y on profits in region x and the subsequent impact on the long term distribution. A higher adoption in region y may lead to an increase in productivity, thus reducing profits in case the demand for the good is inelastic. This may have an adverse impact on adoption in region x.
For parameters: sigma=5;theta=2;m=2;q=1;t1=0;t2=.5;t3=1;t4=.5;t5=1;t6=1.5;t7=1;t8=1.5;t9=2;
We consider a positive impact on region y's profits from technology adoption, but no impact on region x's profits. That is, the values of t1…t9 are all zeros for region x, whereas they are as given above for region y. It can be verified that the proportion of time spent in states when region x is fully adopted falls almost to half and the proportion of time spent in states when it is fully dis-adopted doubles from the base case. Note that in the long term, the entire region of Mississippi would end up adopting the technology 84 percent of the time. This is slightly lower than the probability of adoption as derived in table 1. When adoption inertia is low, we can assume that a larger fraction of the population makes the decision to adopt the spraying technology in any given time period. Let the new state space be Notice a slight increase in the fraction of time when the entire population ends up adopting the new technology. In fact, as the inertia falls, the long term steady state fraction of time would end up equaling the probability of adoption. Now, let us consider the case when adoption of technology in one region influences adoption in the other region. Farmers in the Heartland region (see Table 2 Notice now that an increase in the complacency effect leads to a dramatic fall in the fraction of time spent in the state when both regions are fully adopted. Also note that region x shows strong negative correlation with region y in terms of fraction of population that has adopted the technology. For instance, when y is fully adopted, the probabilities of region x being fully dis-adopted or fifty percent adopted are .23 and .27 respectively. The above analysis assumes that level of adoption in the Mississippi region has no impact on the level of pest infestation. Similarly, the long term pest infestation may be determined by the level of adoption in both the regions and it is likely that over time the distribution of profits would shift towards the positive side with continued adoption and towards the negative side with low levels of adoption. But, at this stage there is not much empirical evidence to incorporate the endogeniety in probability of adoption brought in by its impact on pest population.
An Application to Soybean Rust
While complacency is one aspect of technology adoption, compulsion may have an equally significant role to play. If farmers insure themselves against pest damages, good management practices require that they spray their crops with fungicides whenever it is required. Failure to follow this protocol might lead to loss in compensation payment from the insuring agency. Also, if spraying by the neighbor increases the risk of infestation on one's own fields, the farmer might be forced to adopt spraying.
Conclusion
Technology adoption against invasive species is guided by several motives as has been demonstrated in this paper. Psychological factors such as complacency and learning from neighbors could play a crucial role in this process.
The existing literature on technology adoption does not provide much guidance over the long term state of technology adoption against invasive species. Yet, long term adoption rates are very significant to understand from policy perspective as they determine whether or not a pest will become endemic.
In this paper, we demonstrated that technology adoption may not be fully realized due to several factors. Chief amongst them are compulsion and complacency. Other factors that feed into these effects are dependent upon the unique characteristics of the invading pests. The application to soybean rust portrays a good possibility of these 
